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PRIDE AND PREJUDICE: 
THE HOMOSEXUAL PANIC DEFENSE 
KARA S. SUFFREDINI* 
Abstract: Gays experience a disturbing paradox in American society 
today: while the gay rights movement elljoys increased visibility, gay-
bashing is perhaps the most common and most rapidly increasing of 
hate-related crimes. The Homosexual Panic Defense (HPD) is based on 
the homosexual panic disorder, a scientific and medical explanation of, 
and justification fOl; the behavior of defendants who murder gay 
individuals. However, while used to justif)· some of the most frequent 
and heinous of hate crimes, the HPD has no uniform definition across 
cases and bears only a tenuous connection to the psychiatric disorder 
that legitimizes it. This Note explores the disassociation between the 
disorder and the defense, and argues that the HPD is not actually based 
on the psychiatric disorder, but rather on social and institutional 
prejudice against gays. This Note concludes that the HPD's use must, 
therefore, either be limited by the application of new evidentiary rules, 
using the rape-shield rules as a guide, or better yet, eliminated 
altogether. 
Don't treat me like I am something that happened to )'ou. 
-Ani DiFranco l 
On March 6, 1995, Scott Amedure appeared with Jonathan 
Schmitz on the Jenny Jones talk show.2 He revealed that he had a se-
cret crush on Schmitz.3 Schmitz was not flattered; rather, he felt "em-
barrassed" and "humiliated."4 
Nor did Schmitz "take it lying dOWll."5 Three days after the tap-
ing, he visited a local bank, withdrew money from his savings account, 
* Editor in Chief, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL (2000-2001). I thank 
SundynaJean Beaven for showing me that loving is courageous and worth the risk. 
1 Ani DiFranco, Adam and Eve, all DILATE (Righteous Babe Records 1996). 
2 See People v. Schmitz. 586 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
3/d. 
4 See id. 
5 See id. I use this cliche to demonstrate that the value that American society assigns to 
sexual aggression pervades all aspects of our culture, including our most common linguis-
tic expl-essions. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE LJ. 1087, 1091 (1986) (discussing the ef-
fects of male and female sex roles, aggressive and passive, respectively, on rape law): see also 
discussion iufia Part LA (outlining the relationship between cultural sex roles and preju-
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and purchased a shotgun.6 He then drove to Amedure's trailer.' 
Standing at the door, Schmitz shot Amedure twice through the heart, 
killing him.s He then left the trailer, dialed 911, and confessed to the 
shooting.9 
Because Schmitz's deadly reaction stemmed from an appearance 
on a national talk show, People v. Schmitz is perhaps the most infamous 
case in which a defendant has asserted the Homosexual Panic De-
fense (HPD).lO In defense of his actions, Schmitz argued that the hu-
miliation of being objectified by Amedure's homosexual affections 
drove him to kill.l1 Basically, he blamed Amedure; more specifically, 
he blamed Amedure's sexuality.I2 In so doing, he asked the jury to 
sympathize with his reaction to this homosexual crush. I3 They sympa-
thized. I4 The jury found Schmitz guilty of the lesser offense of second-
degree murder, despite the fact that the prosecution tried him for 
first-degree murder.I5 
Although the Schmitz case is an infamous example of the HPD's 
role in reducing culpability for anti-gay violence, the case is not 
unique. I6 To the contrary, a troubling pattern has emerged from cases 
involving the HPD; from the inconsistent and inaccurate manner with 
which attorneys assert the defense, to the prejudices attorneys and 
judges explicitly rely on to decide whether to employ the defense, to 
dice against gays). This cliche also reflects how our culture devalues sexual passivity, such 
as that attributed to women and gay men, while privileging aggression, perhaps even to the 
degree ofjusti£Ying violence. See Estrich, supm, at 1091; see also discussion infra Part I.A. 
6 Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d at 768. 
7Id. 
B See id. 
9Id. 
10 See generally Robert G. Bagnall et aI., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in 
the Court System: Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REv. 497, 497-515 (1984) (detailing case law involving the HPD). 
11 See Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d at 768; Good Morning America: Defense Attorneys' Use of "Gay 
Panic" Defense in Matthew Shepard Murder T,ial (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 29, 1999) 
[hereinafter Good jWorning Amelical. 
12 See Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d at 768; Good Morning Amelica, supra note 11. 
13 See Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d at 768; Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Man-
slaughtel': The Homosexual Advance Defense as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv. 133, 136, 
167 (1992) (arguing that the HPD attempts to garner jury sympathy by reinforcing anti-gay 
prejudices) . 
14 See Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d at 768. 
15 See id.; see also Risky "Gay Panic" Defense Emerges at Murder Trial, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 
1999, at 10 (stating that Jonathan Schmitz's case was a perfect example of using the HPD 
to mitigate a murder conviction). 
16 See gellel'ally Bagnall et aI., supm note 10, at 497-515 (tracing the use of the HPD to 
mitigate murder). 
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the egregious violence that juries excuse when they are exposed to 
the defense, it is clear that when a judge allows a defendant to use the 
HPD, she allows that defendant to blame the victim, to solicit court-
room actors' anti-gay biases, and to further institutionalize in the legal 
system our society's prejudice against gays.I7 Because "[t]here is rea-
son to believe that gay-bashing is the most common and most rapidly 
increasing ... [of] hate-related crimes in the United States," the con-
tinued use of the HPD raises disturbing questions concerning the ex-
tent to which the legal system-and the society it reflects and suppos-
edly protects-is willing to condone prejudice and excuse violence 
against gays. IS 
This Note argues that the HPD is based on, reinforces, and per-
petuates prejudice and violence against gays.I9 Therefore, its use must 
either be limited by the application of new evidentiary rules or, better 
yet, eliminated altogether. Part I discusses the social perceptions of 
sex, gender, and sexuality that set the stage and scenery for the for-
mulation and assertion of the HPD. Parts II and III relate the evolu-
tion of the HPD from its anemic roots as a psychological disorder to 
its reported debut as a robust legal defense. This evolution demon-
strates that the defense as asserted and applied is not based on the 
psychiatric literature, but on anti-gay stereotypes and prejudices. Part 
IV details examples of the HPD's use, revealing its powerful seduction 
of courtroom actors' prejudices and its concomitant potential for 
abuse. Part V makes recommendations for the future of the defense, 
using the theories that fueled rape reform rules as a guide. Finally, 
this Note concludes that as the status of gays in this society improves, 
it becomes increasingly evident that the costs of the HPD exceed its 
benefits. 
17 See Mison, sl/pm note 13, at 13,~, 135-36, 162-6,~, 171; see also discussion injm Part IV. 
18 EYE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 18 (1990); see Bagnall et 
a\., sll/Jm note 10, at 498. 
19 See Gary Da\'id Comstock, Dismantlillg the HOII/osexual Panir Defense, 2 TuL. J.L. & 
SEXUALITY 81, 81 (1992). 
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I. WEAPONS OF CULTURAL GENOCIDE: SEX, SEXUALITY, AND GENDER 
Our bodies are the battleground where a war to regulate and control gender 
expression is inaeasingly beingfought. 
-Riki Anne Wilchins 20 
In her book, The Epistemology of the Closet, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
states that the HPD "rests on the falsely individualizing and patholo-
gizing assumption that hatred of homosexuals is so private and so 
atypical a phenomenon in this culture as to be classifiable as an ac-
countability-reducing illness. "21 However, the widespread acceptance 
of this defense, she argues, in conjunction with the fact that compa-
rable defenses have never been, and presumably never would be for-
mally asserted in relation to other traditionally disadvantaged popula-
tions, suggests that hatred of gays is, to the contrary, actually more 
public and more typical than hatred of any other disadvantaged 
group.22 Thus, a basic understanding of the pervasive presence and 
particular manifestations of prejudice against gays in American society 
is necessary to appreciate the problems inherent in the formulation 
and use ofthe HPD.23 
A. The Interpersonal Battle 
American culture and society is heterocentric.24 That is, a hetero-
sexual perspective permeates American understandings of sex, gen-
der, and sexuality, and confines the realm of appropriate social inter-
actions accordingly.25 Thus, what it means to be male or female, a 
man or a woman, is the basic foundation upon which social relation-
ships are built and from which flow acceptable, indeed legal, interac-
tions.26 
20 Riki Anne Wilchills, Why We're Here, Statement of Purpose at the Brandon Teena 
Vigil in Falls City, Nebraska on May 15, 1995, http://www.ftm-intI.OI-g/Hist/Bran/ 
stmnt.riki.html (last modified Aug. 5, 2000) (on file with author). 
21 SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19. 
22 See id. (stating that "I-ace panic" and "gender panic" are not accepted as defenses to 
violence against people of color and women, respectively). 
23 See id_ (arguing that the widespread acceptance of the HPD shows that hatred of 
gays is harder to find leverage against than hatred of any other group). 
24 See Mison, supra note 13, at 155. 
25 See Francisco Valdes, Unpacking Hetem-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender 
& Sexual Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 161, 169-70, 179 (1996). 
26 SeeJulia A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between 
Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ_ L. RE\,. 265, 270 (1999); Valdes, supra note 25, at 169-70, 179. A 
discussion about the failure of these binary categories to reflect reality is beyond the scope 
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Heterocentricism envisions a rigid, binary system of sex, gender, 
and commensurate sexuality.27 Accordingly, sex generally refers to an 
individual's status as either biologically male or female, while gender 
typically refers to an individual's social role as either masculine or 
feminine.28 Males and females typically become men and women, re-
spectively.29 Men have a masculine social role, and women have a 
feminine social role.30 It is fiercely debated whether these social roles 
construct, or are the result of, gender. 31 However, viewed either way, 
as the embodiment of one's social role as determined by one's sex, 
gender is the social performance of one's sex.32 
An integral part of this performance is sexual behavior.33 Hetero-
centricism presumes a sexuality commensurate with the binary system 
of sex and gender; it presumes that all men and women are hetero-
sexua1.34 In this way, heterosexuality is compulsory.35 That is, part of 
one's gender, part of the performance of one's sex, part of what it 
means to be a man or a woman is an attraction to, and only to, and 
sexual behavior with, and only with, members of the other biological 
sex and gender.36 
Compulsory heterosexuality is a form of social control; it 
confines, regulates, and reproduces the realm of cognizable sexes, 
genders, and sexuality.37 Thus, gay men,38 who do not conform to this 
heterosexual compulsion, but rather step outside the cognizable 
of this Note. See Greenberg, supm, at 275. However, for an excellent deconstruction of sex 
and gender, see generally id. 
27 See Patricia A. Cain, St01ies from the Gender Garden: Tmnssexllals and Anti-Disclimination 
Lalli, 75 DEN\,. U. L. RE\,. 1321, 1332-33 (1998); Greenberg, suj1m note 26, at 271, 274; 
Hasan Shafiqullah, Shape-Shiftrrs, iWasquemders & Subversives: An Argument for the Libemtion of 
Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 195, 196 (1997); Valdes, supra note 25, 
at 164-66, 169. 
28 See Cain, sllpra note 27, at 1332-33; Greenberg, supm note 26, at 271, 274; Valdes, 
supra note 25, at 164-66; Shafiqullah, supm note 27, at 196. 
29 See Cain, supra note 27, at 1332-33; Greenberg, supra note 26, at 275, 278; Valdes, 
supm note 25, at 164-66; Shafiqullah, supm note 27, at 196. 
30 See Valdes, supra note 25, at 166. 
31 SeeShafiqullah, supra note 27, at 217-19. 
32 See Valdes, supra note 25, at 164, 168. 
33 See id. at 168. 
34 Seeid. at 168-70. 
35 See id. at 169-70. 
36 See id. at 166, 169-70. 
37 See Valdes, supra note 25, at 168-69. 
38 This Note focuses on the social and legal experiences of gay men because a perusal 
of the case law involving the HPD suggests that it is not assened to defend women who 
react violently to lesbian solicitations. See Comstock, sllj1m note 19, at 89-90. F01" a discus-
sion of the HPD's gender exclusive assertion, see infra Part III.B.6. 
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boundaries for sex and gender by being sexually attracted to, and by 
engaging in sexual behaviors with, members of their same sex and 
gender, are out of control.39 As such, they are stereotyped as sex-
crazed predators who "may plausibly be accused of making sexual ad-
vances to strangers. "40 
This cultural stereotype sets the stage for the assertion of the 
HPD.41 According to the heterocentric system, men are sexually ag-
gressive, and women are passive and chaste.42 Thus, it is acceptable, 
indeed expected, that men will "hit on"43 women, and concomitantly, 
that women will be "hit on" by men.44 However, it is unacceptable for 
men to "hit on," or to be "hit on" by, other men.45 Moreover, such be-
havior is both individually and systemically terrifying, because it rele-
gates the objectified man into the passive, female role in the interac-
tion, and in so doing, makes him the target of the gay man's 
predatory urges.46 This interaction destabilizes both the social role of 
the objectified man, as well as the entire heterocentric system of sex 
and gender relations.47 Because this system demands that heterosex-
ual men be aggressive in all sexual interactions-that they not "take it 
lying down"-American culture and society seems to suggest, if not 
demand, that it is both appropriate and necessary for a man, in re-
sponding to gay male attentions, to reestablish and reaffirm both his 
individual social role and the stability of the entire heterocentric sys-
39 See Valdes, supra note 25, at 170, 179; James D. Wilets, Conceptualizing Private ~'iolence 
Against Sexual Minorities as Gendered Violence: An International and Comparative Law Perspective, 
60 ALB. L. RE\'. 989, 1006 (1997) (conceptualizing sexual minorities as "gende1' outlaws" 
because they violate socially prescribed gender mles). 
40 Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Benill, Implications fm' Policy, in HATE CRIMES: CON-
FRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 95 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. 
Berrill eds., 1992); see SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19; Valdes, supra note 25, at 170, 179. 
41 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19-20. 
42 See Estrich, supra note 5, at 1091; Valdes, supra note 25, at 169-70, 179. 
43 This is another cliche that demonstrates the premiulIl that American culture places 
on power, control, aggression and perhaps, violence in sexual encounters. Valdes, .5Ilpra 
note 25, at 170, 179. 
44 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 99 (implying that heterosexual solicitation is so 
common as to be invulnerable to legal attack). 
45 See id. (noting the sharp contrast between the court's appmval of violence against 
gays in response to homosexual solicitations and the freedom with which heterosexual 
men can solicit women). 
46 See Herek & Berrill, sujna note 40, at 295; Valdes, supra note 25, at 169-70; Mison, 
supra note 13, at 158. 
47 See Valdes, supra note 25, at 179 (noting that the universe of appmpriate social in-
teractions conceives of "active" males). 
2001] Homosexual Panic Defense 285 
tem.48 By pressuring men to engage in this degree of social role polic-
ing in their interpersonal interactions, society appears to create a uni-
versalizing assumption "that violence, often to the point of homicide, 
is a legitimate response to any [homo] sexual advance [,] whether wel-
come or not. "49 
B. The Institutional Battle 
Although this propensity for violence against gays suggests that 
gays would be well served to seek protection from the law, such is not, 
in fact, entirely the case.50 Surprisingly, perhaps, the heterocentric 
prejudice and fear directed toward gays interpersonally is institution-
alized in the legal system.51 For example, the United States Supreme 
Court reads the Federal Constitution to protect extended as well as 
nuclear families, but neither the Constitution, nor a single state, rec-
ognizes gay marriage.52 Although the possibility of gay marriage 
flowed from a recent landmark decision in Vermont-a case in which 
the state supreme court held that gays are entitled to the benefits and 
obligations of marriage under the Common Benefits Clause of the 
Vermont Constitution-the court declined to recognize that gays have 
a right to call their unions "marriages."53 Furthermore, tlle fact that 
Congress created an act to relieve states from having to give full faith 
and credit to gay marriages performed in neighboring states before any 
states recognized these unions, and titled it the Defense of Marriage 
Act, demonstrates that fear as well as prejudice is institutionalized in 
the legal system.54 
48 See id. at 169-70, 179 (stating that the man's role is to actively manage and protect 
subordinates for the benefi t of all) . 
49 See SEDGWICK, sujJra note 18, at 19. 
50 See Mison, supra note 13, at 150. 
51 See id. 
52 NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, SPECIFIC ANTI-SAME-SEX MARRIAGE LAWS IN 
THE U.S., http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/malTiagemap0201.pdf (last modified Jan. 
2001); see, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-97, 499-500 (1977) 
(finding unconstitutional an East Cleveland housing ordinance that limited occupancy to 
members of a single family in such a way as to disqualifY appellant, who resided with her 
son and two grandsons who were first cousins); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 
(1965) (finding a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the right 
to marital privacy that falls within the penumbra of the specific guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights). 
53 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (leaving it to the Vermont legislature 
to decide whether to grant gays "marriage," or an institution by another name with equiva-
lent benefits and obligations). 
54 See Pub. L. No. 104-199, no Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 1999) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. 1998)). 
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Sodomy laws are further evidence of the legal system's prejudice 
against gays.55 The 1986 Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 
disparagingly declined to extend the Federal Constitutional right to 
privacy to "homosexual sodomy," stating that a claim to such a right is 
"at best, facetious. "56 Despite the fact that the Court was ruling on an 
appeal from a conviction under Georgia's sodomy statute-a statute 
that Georgia has since overturned-Bowers has yet to be overruled.57 
Furthermore, despite this significant reversal in Georgia, thirteen 
states maintain statutes that criminalize sodomy.58 Five of these states 
exclusively prohibit same-sex sodomy.59 
In addition to devaluing gay relationships, the legal system em-
bodies a deadly ambivalence toward the increasing frequency and 
brutality of violence against gays. The juxtaposition of the Hate 
Crimes Statistics Act of 1990 (Statistics Act) with the proposed Hate 
Crime Prevention Act of 1999 (HCPA) is an example of alarming 
complacency toward, if not implicit support of, prejudice and vio-
lence against gays.60 
Congress enacted the Statistics Act as part of an effort to identify 
the frequency of hate crimes against particular victims.61 The Act was 
the first piece of federal legislation recognizing gay individuals as fre-
quent hate crime targets, and it authorized the collection of data re-
lating to crimes against them.62 However, when Congress enacted the 
Statistics Act, no legislation existed that enabled enhanced punish-
ments for anti-gay hate crimes.63 Although Congress later enacted leg-
islation enhancing sentences for some hate crimes in 1994 (Sentenc-
ing Enhancement Act), the legislation only called for, but did not 
create, enhanced sentencing guidelines for hate crimes against gays.64 
Today, eleven years after enacting the Statistics Act, Congress still 
has not enacted legislation to enhance sentencing guidelines for anti-
gay hate crimes. Although legislation to this effect-namely, the 
55 See Mison, supm note 13, at 151. 
56 SeeBowersv. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). 
57 See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998). 
58 NAT'L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE U.S., 
http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/sodomymap0101.pdf (last modified Jan. 2001). 
59Id. 
60 See generally Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (Slipp. 1998); S. 622, 106th 
Congo (1999); H.R. 1082, 106th Congo (1999). 
61 See Andrew M. Gilbert & Eric D. Marchand, Note, Splitting the Atom (ff Splitting Hairs-
The Hate Climes Prevention Act of 1999,30 ST. MARY'S LJ. 931, 951 (1999). 
62 SeeURVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY 11 (1995). 
63 See Gilbert & Marchand, supra note 61, at 951. 
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Slipp. 1998); Gilbert & Marchand, supra note 61, at 958. 
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HCPA-has been repeatedly introduced in Congress, it was not first 
introduced until eight years after the Statistics Act and four years after 
the Sentencing Enhancement Act each took effect.65 Moreover, thus 
far, it has failed several times, in its several forms, to pass.66 Consider-
ing that federal lawmakers implicitly acknowledged violence against 
gays in the Statistics Act, their unwillingness to enact legislation that 
would discourage such violence is alarming.67 When coupled with the 
violent interpersonal battles that gays face, the heterocentricism insti-
tutionalized in the legal system-most evident in the devaluation of 
gay relationships and perhaps, sanction of anti-gay violence-demon-
strates an atmosphere primed for the successful formulation and as-
sertion of the victim-blaming defense, the HPD.68 
II. HOMOSEXUAL PANIC-THE PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER 
Cases in which homicide defendants are charged with the mur-
der of a gay individual typically involve two complimentary defense 
theories that are usually asserted together.69 One theory is self-
defense.7o Self-defense has been asserted successfully by homicide de-
fendants who claim that they were the victims of an attempted homo-
sexual rape.71 
The other defense theory is the HPD.72 The HPD is based on a 
scientific and medical explanation of, and justification for, the behav-
ior of defendants who murder gay individuals.73 The basic theory of 
this defense posits that a homosexual solicitation can cause a latently 
gay defendant to "panic," to become temporarily unable to distin-
guish right from wrong, and to severely beat or kill the solicitor.74 Un-
like self-defense, which has been a successful defense theory when the 
triggering action was an attempted rape, the HPD has proven success-
ful even when the victim's triggering action was as slight "as a non-
65 SeeS. 622; H.R. 1082; S. 1529, 105th Congo (1997); H.R. 3081, 105th Congo (1997). 
66 See Gilbert & Marchand, supra note 61. at 972; Alan Fram, Lawmakers DI"OP Hate-
ClimRs Bill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 8, 1999 (discllssing the death of the HCPA of 1999 in 
the House-Senate Conference Committee). 
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. 1998). 
68 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 20; Mison, supra note 13, at 150. 
69 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 82. 
70 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 498. 
71 See id. 
72 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 82. 
73 See id. 
74 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 499. 
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violent verbal or gestural solicitation. "75 As such, the defendant claims 
that his culpability should be mitigated both by the fact that the victim 
triggered the violent reaction and by the fact that the reaction itself 
was uncontrollable.76 
A. The Homosexual Panic Disorder 
The advent of "homosexual panic" as a legal defense is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon when compared to its existence as a psy-
chiatric disorder.77 Although research and documentation of the dis-
order is scant and sketchy, clinical psychiatrist Edward]. Kempf first 
coined the phrase "acute homosexual panic" in 1920.78 Based on only 
nineteen case histories of soldiers and sailors that he studied in a gov-
ernment mental institution during and after World War I, Kempf 
defined the disorder as "a panic due to the pressure of uncontrollable 
sexually perverse cravings. "79 He attributed the onset of the panic to 
the fact that his patients had been grouped together in same-sex envi-
ronments for prolonged periods during the War.80 
According to Kempf, the disorder has "dual determinators": the 
patient's terror of his attraction to homosexuality coupled with his 
fear of heterosexuality.81 He noted that these fears are most apparent 
and least controllable in same-sex environments.82 However, the fear 
in these situations is not due to homosexual propositions or advances, 
rather, it is the result of aroused homosexual cravings that pose seri-
ous challenges to the patient's self contro1.83 
Subsequent psychiatric dictionaries have lent support to Kempf's 
findings. 84 For example, Robert]. Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary de-
scribes the panic state as typically triggered by "separation from a 
member of the same sex" to whom the patient has become "emotion-
ally attached."85 Thus, according to the psychiatric literature, the con-
ditions precipitating homosexual panic are "the overwhelming and 
75Id. 
76 See SEDGWICK, Sllpra note 18. at 19; Comstock, sllpra note 19, at 82. 
77 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 499. 
78 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 82-84. 
79 EDWARD J. KEMPF, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 477 (1920); Bagnall et aI., sllpra note 10, at 
499. 
80 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 499. 
81 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 511. 
82 See id. at 479-80. 
83 See id. at 479-80,507. 
84 See ROBERTJ. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 328 (6th ed. 1989). 
85 Id. 
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exclusive presence of members of [an individual's] own gender, or 
the absence of [such] a same-gender relationship to which [an indi-
vidual has] become accustomed. "86 
The onset of the panic itself includes periods of introspective 
brooding, self-punishment, suicidal assaults, withdrawal, and help-
lessness.87 Patients demonstrate "passivity" and an "inability to be ag-
gressive. "88 More pointedly, according to Burton Glick, author of an 
article summarizing the results of his survey of the available case stud-
ies on homosexual panic, patients are "unable to function at all. "89 
Thus, according to this psychiatric literature, the homosexual 
panic disorder does not manifest as a single, passionate fit in which 
the patient is driven to brutally beat or kill another person.90 In fact, 
not one of Kempf's cases included a report of violence by patients to-
ward others because of a sexual advance.91 To the contrary, his pa-
tients lacked the ability to use such violence, resorting instead to self-
punishments and suicide.92 Similarly, in his 1958 study on the fear of 
homosexuality in college students, Henry Harper Hart reported not 
only that none acted violently toward others, but also that all patients 
blamed themselves for their homosexual cravings.93 Thus, the homo-
sexual panic disorder is not a temporary, violent episode, but rather 
an on-going illness that is augmented by bouts of severe depression 
and withdrawa1.94 Notably, Hart concluded that accepting the homo-
sexual cravings or engaging in homosexual behavior "often relieve[d] 
anxiety. "95 
B. The Acute Aggression Panic Disorder 
In his survey of the literature on the homosexual panic disorder, 
Glick notes that one of the primary sources of confusion in making a 
homosexual panic diagnosis, and a consequent misdiagnosis, stems 
86 Comstock, slljJra note 19, at 84. 
87 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 491; Henry Harper Hart. Fear of Homosl'xuality in College 
Students, in PSYCHOSOCIAL PROBLEMS OF COLLEGE MEN 200, 205 (Bryant M. Wedge ed., 
1958) . 
88 Comstock, supra note 19, at 87-88. 
89 Burton S. Glick, Homosexual Panic: Clinical alld Theoreliral Considerations, 129 J. 
NERYOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 20, 21 (1959). 
90 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 87, 9'~. 
91 See id. at 84. 
92 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 491. 
93 See Hart, supra note 87, at 203-07. 
94 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 87, 93. 
95 See Hart, supra note 87, at 203-07, 212. 
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from the failure of the psychiatric literature to clearly identifY which 
instinctual drive underlies the disorder.96 Generally, the two great in-
stinctual drives are the sexual and the aggressive.97 Glick explains that 
in a healthy personality, these drives are "fused and balanced," while 
in a psychotic personality, they are split or unbalanced.98 Patients who 
suffer from a predominate sexual drive, such as those who endure 
overwhelming homosexual cravings, can be diagnosed appropriately 
as suffering from homosexual panic.99 However, patients who suffer 
from a predominate aggressive drive, such as those who react violently 
to sexual advances, cannot. IOO Glick asserts that cases involving aggres-
sion implicate a different instinctual drive than the drive that under-
lies homosexual panic disorder, and they therefore should be under-
stood to implicate a different disorder than homosexual panic. IOI He 
labels this disorder "acute aggression panic. "102 
Glick's observations make an important distinction on a point 
that the psychiatric literature muddles,l°3 For example, "recent litera-
ture describes how the psychological theory of homosexual panic has 
been used by psychiatrists ... to explain [violent] criminal activity. "104 
Typical of these cases is a situation in which a man initially allows him-
self to be solicited or seduced by another man, but then suddenly 
turns upon the solicitor and beats or even kills him.lo5 Psychiatrists 
assert that the overwhelming fury that characterizes the attacker's re-
actions in these scenarios cannot be attributed only to feelings of dis-
gust, but must additionally be attributed to latent homosexual crav-
ings or a comparable collapse of a heterosexual self-image,lo6 They 
label this disproportionate anxiety "homosexual panic. "107 
However, as Glick notes, these scenarios are better understood as 
implicating acute aggression panic because, although they involve the 
sexual drive, their primary symptom is a loss of control of the aggres-
sive drive, and it is acute aggression panic disorder that describes this 
96 See Glick, supra note 89, at 26. 
97 See id. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. (citing KEMPF. supra note 79). 
100 See id. 
101 See Glick, sllpra note 89, at 26. 
102 See id. 
103 SeeColIlstock, sllpra note 19, at 88. 
104 Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 500. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. 
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predominance of the aggressive drive.lOs Moreover, regardless of the 
label given situations implicating aggression, these scenarios should 
not be confused with the homosexual panic disorder because the abil-
ity to aggress, particularly toward others, is noticeably absent in pa-
tients suffering from homosexual panic.109 
Glick's distinction finds support in some current psychiatric dic-
tionaries that recognize the homosexual panic disorder,llo Campbell's 
Psychiatric Dictionary adopts this apt distinction, but it is grammatically 
embedded within the definition of homosexual panic disorder, per-
haps contributing to, rather than clarifying, the confusion. lll Mter 
listing the type of symptoms that Kempf recorded, such as depression 
and withdrawal, the Psychiatric Dictionary explains that "[ s] ometimes, 
instead of overt sexual material, the anxiety is related to fears of ... 
physical violence ... [and] [s]uch an episode is termed acute aggres-
sion panic. "112 
However confused in the literature, Glick's distinction between 
the homosexual panic and acute aggression disorders is critical for 
two reasons.1l3 First, while violence triggered by one's disconcerting 
realization of a predisposition to homosexual desires may garner 
sympathy and reduce culpability in our heterocentric society, violence 
triggered by one's predisposition to aggress, even if directed toward 
another in relation to their homosexuality, is unlikely to elicit compa-
rable sympathy,l14 Second, Glick's distinction moots any discussion of 
violence and relative culpability with relation to the homosexual panic 
disorder. 115 As he explains, while the disorder implicates anxiety over 
one's own homosexuality, it neither implicates anxiety over another's 
homosexuality, nor does it result in violence toward others.1l6 Unfor-
tunately, however, this discussion is only theoretically moot,l17 Function-
ally, it is alive and kicking: the evolution of the homosexual panic dis-
order into a legal defense has tended, with telling ease, to mimic, and 
108 See Gli('k, sujJra note 89, at 26 ('iting KEMPF, supra note 79). 
109 SeeComsto('k, supra note 19, at 87, 93; Glick, sujJra note 89, at 26. 
110 See CAMPBELL, supra note 84, at 328. 
111 See id. 
112Id. 
113 See Comsto(,k, supra note 19, at 89. 
114 See id. 
115 See KEMPF, sujJra note 79, at 477; Comsto(,k, sujna note 19, at 87, 93. 
116 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 477; Comsto(,k, supra note 19, at 87,93. 
117 SeeComsto('k, supra note 19, at 86-96. 
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perhaps rely 011, its conflation in the psychiatric literature with the 
symptoms of acute aggression panic disorder.1l8 
III. HOMOSEXUAL PANIC - THE LEGAL DEFENSE 
The conflation of the homosexual panic and acute aggression 
disorders in the psychiatric literature fuels the use and abuse of the 
HPD in the legal system.1l9 Although it is used to justify some of the 
most frequent and heinous of hate crimes, the HPD has no uniform 
definition across cases and bears a tenuous connection to the psychi-
atric disorder that legitimizes it.120 These problems belie a troubling 
lack of emphasis in the legal system on detecting and only defending 
bona fide instances of homosexual panic disorder.121 
A. The Definitional Inconsistencies 
The HPD is wrought with two specific definitional inconsistencies 
across cases.l22 The first inconsistency concerns whether the defen-
dant who raises the HPD must be a latent homosexual.l 23 The second 
inconsistency involves whether the HPD is a form of insanity de-
fense. 124 
1. Latent Homosexuality 
The consistent occurrence of inconsistent assertions of the HPD 
raises questions as to whether homosexual panic, as a legal defense, 
requires that a defendant be a latent homosexual, as does the disor-
der on which the defense is based.125 The first reported judicial men-
tion of the HPD in the 1967 case of People v. Rodriguez. is typical of 
cases in which the defendant neglects to assert that he is a latent ho-
mosexual.l26 In Rodriguez, the seventeen-year-old defendant testified 
that he was urinating in an alley when an "old man," grabbed him 
from behind.127 The defendant picked up a four-foot-Iong stick, at-
118 See id. 
Jl9 See id. at 86, 89. 
120 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19; Comstock, sllj!ra note 19, at 86-96; Herek & 
Berrill, supra note 40, at 295; Bagnall et aI., slipra note 10, at 502. 
121 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10,502-12. 
122 See id. 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. at 502. 
126 See 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1967). 
127 [d. at 255. 
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tacked the old man, and eventually killed him.l28 The defendant 
pleaded not guilty, asserting that his actions were the result of an 
acute homosexual panic brought on by a fear that the old man was 
"trying to engage in a homosexual act. "129 However, while asserting a 
fear of the victim's homosexuality, the defendant failed to attribute 
this fear to his own latent cravings,l3O Nonetheless, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of second-degree murder.131 
Similar to Rodriguez, the defendant in State v. Thornton substituted 
his disgust for and aversion to other individuals' homosexuality for an 
appropriate emphasis on his own latent homosexuality.132 The defen-
dant stated that "[q]ueers and freaks upset [him] a lot" and that he 
tried "to stay away from them as much as possible. "133 Accordingly, 
when the victim put his hands around the defendant's waist, the de-
fendant lost his temper and stabbed him to death. 134 In his confession 
the defendant stated, "I know that he was trying to queer me" and 
"[I] went out of my mind completely insane," although he equally 
admitted that the victim "had not made any threats" to him.13s Thus, 
as in Rodriguez, the Thornton case made no direct reference to the de-
fendant's latent orientation in attempting to establish the HPD.136 
Nonetheless, in deliberating between second-degree murder and the 
lesser offense of manslaughter, the jury convicted the defendant of 
the lesser offense.137 
Similar to Rodriguez and Thornton, the defendant in Commonwealth 
v. Shelley neglected to assert that he was a latent homosexual,l38 In Shel-
ley, the defendant agreed to spend the night with the victim and to 
share his bed.139 VVhen the victim began to make "sexual advances," 
the defendant became "[u]pset[,] ... jumped out of bed[,] and went 
downstairs to the kitchen for a drink. "140 He returned to the bedroom 
with a meat cleaver and a roasting fork, turned off the bathroom light 
128/d. 
129 See id. at 254, 255. 
130 See id. at 255. 
131 See Rodligllez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 254. 
132 See 532 S.W.2d 37, 40-41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); see also Rodligllez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255. 
133 Thornton, 532 S.W.2d at 40. 
134 See id. 
135 [d. at 40-4l. 
136 See id.; see also Rodligllez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255. 
137 See Thol'l1ton, 532 S.W.2d at 41. 
138 See 373 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Mass. 1978); see also Rodliguez. 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255; ThoT11-
tOil, 532 S.W.2d at 40-4l. 
139 Shel1e),. 373 N.E.2d at 953. 
140 [d. 
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to ensure that the victim could not see the weapons, and sat down on 
the bed.141 When the victim reached for him again, the defendant at-
tacked, "repeatedly hitting him with a meat cleaver, stabbing him with 
the roasting fork, choking him, and finally jumping on his head. "142 
At trial, although the defendant emphasized that the victim's homo-
sexual advances triggered his homosexual panic, he neglected to as-
sert that these advances triggered a panic because he was a latent ho-
mosexual.143 Unlike Rodriguez and Thornton, the jury in Shelley rejected 
the defendant's defense. l44 
Conversely, the defendant in People v. Parisie was careful to at-
tempt to establish that he was "a highly latent homosexual. "145 On the 
night of the murder, the victim offered a ride to the defendant.146 The 
victim drove him past a lake, down a gravel road, and then parked.147 
The victim turned off the headlights and solicited the defendant, 
smiling and saying that "if the defendant refused he would have to 
walk. "148 At trial, the defendant pled not guilty, testifying that when his 
latent cravings were aroused, he "blew up, went crazy," and shot the 
victim.149 The jury found Parisie guilty of murder.150 
Latent homosexuality is a fundamental component of the homo-
sexual panic disorder.151 However, these cases exemplify that latent 
homosexuality is inconsistently included in defendant's assertions of 
the HPD.152 While troubling in and of itself, perhaps the most disturb-
ing aspect of this inconsistency is that the inclusion of, or failure to 
include, a defendant's latent homosexuality in establishing the HPD 
seems to bear no clear correlation to the success or failure of a par-
ticular assertion of the HPD.153 
141 fd. 
142 fd. 
143 See id. 
IH 373 N.E.2d at 952-53; see also State v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1975); People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 254 (1967). 
145 See 287 N.E.2d 310, 314 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); see also Rodliglle7.., 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255; 
Shelley, 373 N.E.2d at 953; Thomtoll, 532 S.W.2d at 40-41. 
146 Patisie, 287 N.E.2d at 313. 
147/d. 
148 fd. at 313-14. 
149 See id. at 314. 
150 fd. at 315. 
151 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 511; Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 502. 
152 See People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1967); Parisie, 287 N.E.2d at 314; 
Commonwealth v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Mass. 1978); State v. Thornton, 532 
S.W.2d 37, 40-41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
153 See Rod,igue7.., 64 Cal. Rptr. at 254; Parisie, 287 N.E.2d at 314; Thornton, 532 S.W.2d at 
41. 
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2. Legal Insanity 
Similar to the inconsistent inclusion of a defendant's latent ho-
mosexuality in asserting the HPD, the assertion of the HPD as a form 
of insanity defense suffers from two deficiencies that suggest this use 
of the defense is inappropriate.l54 First, the psychiatric moorings of 
the HPD do not clearly indicate that the homosexual panic disorder 
can appropriately be understood as either a form of culpability-
reducing mental illness or a type of legal insanity.155 Second, the vari-
ant success of such inconsistent assertions exacerbates the already 
tenuous connection that the HPD bears to the disorder. 156 
Mental illness is not synonymous with the "insanity" defense, and 
"[i] n order for mental illness to exonerate criminal behavior, the per-
son must not be able to tell right from wrong or not understand the 
character of their actions. "157 However, individuals suffering from the 
homosexual panic disorder suffer because of the degree to which they 
are aware that homosexuality is "wrong. "158 Additionally, cases involv-
ing the HPD do not assert that defendants do not realize that stabbing 
their victims with meat cleavers, choking them, beating them with 
clubs, jumping on their heads, or shooting them would cause harm or 
death. 159 Thus, the nature of the homosexual panic disorder does not 
lend itself easily to being understood as the type of mental illness that 
should exonerate violence and murder.160 
Legal insanity requires a showing of "mental disease or defect. "161 
Mere psychological disturbance does not rise to the level of legal in-
sanity.l62 Although it is unclear whether the homosexual panic disor-
der is a mere psychological disturbance or a "mental disease or de-
fect," defendants frequently assert the HPD as a form of insanity 
defense erratically and with erratic results. 163 
For example, in Pansie, while the defendant attempted to assert 
the HPD as an insanity defense, his expert witnesses testified that ho-
154 See KEMPF, slljJra note 79, at 511; Comstock, slljJra note 19, at 94. 
155 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 94. 
156 See id.; Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 502-10; see also discussion iuFa Part III.B. 
157 Comstock, slljn"a note 19, at 94. 
158 fd. 
159 See People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1967); People v. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 
310, 313-14 (III. Ct. App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Mass. 
1978); Comstock, supra note 19, at 94. 
160 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 94. 
161 Bagnall et a\., slipra note 10, at 502. 
162 fd. 
163 See id.; see also infi'a notes 164-169 and accompanying text. 
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mosexual panic is "not a mental defect ... but a psychiatric distur-
bance."164 The jury appropriately rejected Parisie's insanity defense 
and found him guilty of murder. I65 In contrast, in Rodriguez the de-
fendant tried to assert the HPD as an insanity defense without even 
attempting to demonstrate that the HPD meets the "mental disease or 
defect" requirement for establishing legal insanity.I66 Like Parisie, the 
jury rejected Rodriguez's insanity plea and found him guilty of sec-
ond-degree murder.I67 On the other hand, in Shelley the defendant 
explicitly attempted to establish that homosexual panic is a "mental 
defect or disease," yet the jury still rejected this insanity defense.l68 
However, in stark contrast to these cases, the defendant in Thornton 
did not expressly assert that homosexual panic is a "mental disease or 
defect," but the jury nonetheless reduced Thornton's conviction from 
second-degree murder to manslaughter.l69 
In sum, at first blush, the definitional inconsistencies in the asser-
tion and success of the HPD across cases merely raise questions as to 
whether the HPD requires that a defendant be a latent homosexual-
a critical element of the disorder on which the defense is based-and 
whether and how the HPD can be construed as a form of legal insan-
ity.I70 However, something more fundamental than the details of the 
defense lurks in the shadow of these inconsistencies. More important 
than demanding that a defense that excuses such heinous crimes have 
a consistent formulation, is noting what the failure to demand such 
consistency suggests: that perhaps the legal system is not concerned 
about detecting bona fide instances of homosexual panic disorder, 
nor about demanding full accountability for unmitigated anti-gay vio-
lence. I7l 
B. The Disassociation of the Defense and the Disorder 
If examples of the inconsistent assertion and success of the HPD 
across cases belie the legal system's apathy toward detecting bona fide 
cases of homosexual panic disorder, then the disturbingly obvious dis-
164 See 287 N.E.2d at 314, 325. 
165 See iri. at 315. 
166 See People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1967). 
167 See id. at 254; see also Parisie, 287 N.E.2d at 315. 
168 See Commonwealth v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d 951, 952-53 (Mass. 1978). 
169 See State v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 40-41, 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); see also Rodli-
gUe7.., 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255; Pmisie, 287 N.E.2d at 314; Shelley, 373 N.E.2d at 951,952-53. 
170 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 502. 
1i1 See id. at 501-12. 
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association of the HPD, as asserted and applied, from the pivotal fea-
tures of the underlying disorder on which it is based is cause for 
alarm. I72 A general perusal of cases involving the HPD reveals that 
many of the characteristics that are indicative of homosexual panic 
disorder are either raised incorrectly or not raised at all in the asser-
tion of the homosexual panic defense.173 
1. Dual Determinators 
Defendants frequently assert the HPD without asserting both of 
the critical "dual determinators" of the psychiatric disorderP4 As de-
scribed above, defendants frequently fail to assert their latent homo-
sexualityP5 Indeed, this was the case from the moment of the legal 
defense's reported inception in Rodriguez. 176 Moreover, despite the 
primacy of this characteristic in the disorder, the defense has been 
successfully asserted without it, as was the case in Thornton. 177 This 
evinces a fundamental split between the defense and the disorder 
both because, as Kempf originally defined it, one of the disorder's 
"dual determinators" is the patient's terror of his own attraction to 
homosexuality, and because disgust or aversion to another's homo-
sexuality has no role in the psychiatric disorder.178 
In addition to failing to assert their own latent homosexuality, 
defendants typically raise the HPD without establishing their aversion 
to heterosexuality.179 In fact, most defendants are either heterosexu-
ally-identified or involved in heterosexual relationships. ISO Moreover, 
they tend to establish an allegiance to heterosexuality by describing 
their aversion to homosexuality.I81 For example, in Thornton, the de-
fendant's statements that "queers and freaks" upset him and that he 
tried "to stay away from them as much as possible" demonstrated both 
his aversion to homosexuality and his allegiance to heterosexuality.ls2 
172 SerComstock, SlljJl'a note 19, at 86-96; Bagnall et aI., SIlpm note 10, at 501-12. 
173 See Comstock, suj)m note 19, at 86-96. 
174 See KEMPF, supm note 79, at 511; Comstock, SlljJl'(l note 19, at 91. 
175 See Comstock, supmnote 19, at 90-91. 
176 See People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1967). 
177 See State v. Thornton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 41 (1\10. Ct. App. 1975). 
178 See KEMPF, sllj)m note 79, at 511; Comstock, SlIi)/'{[ note 19, at 90. 
179 SI'I' KEMPF, supra note 79, at 511; Comstock, Slli)/'{[ note 19, at 91. 
180 Sl'eComstock, supm note 19, at 91. 
181 See Thornton, 532 S.W.2d at 40; Comstock, sllj)/'{[ note 19, at 91. 
182 Sl'e 532 S.W.2d at 40 (emphasis added). 
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2. Long-Term Nature 
Not only is the HPD frequently disassociated from the pivotal 
"dual determinators" of the disorder, but it is additionally typically 
asserted in a manner that fails to recognize the disorder's long-term 
nature.l83 "Nowhere in the literature is the panic described as a vio-
lent episode that begins and ends within minutes or hours," yet de-
fendants persist in framing their crimes as temporary outbursts solely 
precipitated by the victim's homosexual solicitation, instead of estab-
lishing the disorder's requisite history of attachment to individuals of 
the same sex.184 Again, such was the case in the HPD's debut in Rodri-
guez, in which, instead of offering evidence of an history of latent ho-
mosexual cravings or attachment to individuals of the same gender, 
the defendant testified that he thought the victim was trying to sexu-
ally molest him, and that this alleged assault triggered a "crazy" reac-
tion.l85 Similarly, in Parisie, the defendant asserted that he "blew up" 
and "went crazy" at the moment when the victim allegedly made a 
sexual advance, without articulating an history of same-sex attraction 
as a precipitator to the outburst.186 
Furthermore, cases in which defendants do recognize the impor-
tance of establishing a long-term psychological illness in asserting the 
HPD are marred by a mischaracterization of the quality of the psychi-
atric problems involved in the homosexual panic disorder.l87 For ex-
ample, in Commonwealth v. Carr, the defendant proposed to show a 
lengthy history of constant rejection by women and a consequent so-
cial withdrawal to explain why he became so impassioned as to shoot, 
at close range with a rifle, two women whom he had watched make 
10ve.188 However, while recognizing the longevity of the disorder, the 
defendant's evidence failed to include any same-gender involvement, 
let alone attachment.189 
3. Voluntary Activity 
In addition to neglecting the long-term nature of the disorder, 
defendants occasionally assert the HPD in defense of violence follow-
183 See KEMPF, supm note 79, at 511: Comstock, supra note 19, at 93. 
184 See Comstock, Sit/1m note 19, at 93. 
185 See People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 235, 254-55 (1967). 
186 See People v. Parisie, 287 N.E.2d 310, 313-14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972). 
187 See Comstock, sllpra note 19, at 93. 
188 See580A.2d 1362, 136,\-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
189 See id.; Comstock, supra note 19, at 93. 
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ing voluntary homosexual activity, further contributing to the disasso-
ciation of the defense from the disorder.l90 Since a primary method 
for a patient suffering from bona fide homosexual panic disorder to 
achieve psychological relief is to admit their homosexual tendencies 
and, even better, to engage in homosexual behavior, voluntarily en-
gaging in homosexual behaviors would incite relief, not violence.191 
However, in Shelley, for example, the defendant attempted to establish 
the HPD by testifying that when the victim made a sexual advance he 
became "upset" and stabbed him to death, even though he had 
agreed not only to spend the night with the victim, but also to spend 
the night in his bed with him.192 
4. Self-Defense 
Not only do defendants inappropriately assert the HPD in de-
fense of their violent responses to voluntary same-sex activity, but they 
also use it to buttress independent pleas of self-defense.193 Linking the 
HPD to self-defense is inappropriate, however, because individuals 
who suffer from bona fide homosexual panic disorder do not have 
the capacity to defend themselves.194 After all, it is self-punishment, 
not self-defense, that is indicative of the homosexual panic disorder.195 
Despite the fact that this is a clear disassociation between the defense 
and the disorder, the defendant in lWdriguez testified that he clubbed 
the victim to death because he "thought [the victim] was trying to en-
gage in a homosexual act. "196 Similarly, in Thomton, the defendant 
stated that he shot the victim because he thought that "[the victim] 
was trying to queer [him]. "197 
By linking the HPD with self-defense, defendants not only distort 
a cardinal symptom of the homosexual panic disorder, but they also 
implicitly reject the firmer basis they would have in a legal defense 
based on acute aggression panic disorder.l98 In contrast to homosex-
ual panic, violence is symptomatic of acute aggression panic disor-
190 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 92-93. 
191 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 477, 491, 498; Glick, slljJra note 89, at 27; Hart, supra 
note 87, at 203--07, 212. 
192 See Commonwealth v. Shelley, 373 N.E.2d 951, 953 (Mass. 1978). 
193 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 92, 94-95. 
194 See id. at 94-95; Glick, supra note 89, at 21 (stating that patients are unable to func-
tion at all) . 
195 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 491; Comstock, supra note 19, at 95. 
196 See People Y. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. RptJ~ 253, 255 (1967). 
197 See State v. Thomton, 532 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
198 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 88-89. 
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der.199 In his article, Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, Professor 
Gary Comstock offers two theories for why defendants choose to in-
appropriately assert the HPD over asserting the more appropriate 
acute aggression panic disorder to mitigate anti-gay violence.2oo First, 
he states that the psychiatric literature on acute aggression panic is 
even more scant than the literature discussing the homosexual panic 
disorder.201 Second, and more pointedly, he suggests that defendants 
assume that juries will be more willing to sympathize with a defendant 
who kills a gay man out of rage than with one who claims that his ac-
tions are due to his inability to contain his aggression generally.202 
5. Third Parties 
In addition to inappropriately linking the HPD to independent 
pleas of self-defense, defendants occasionally raise the HPD when they 
were not even the object of the homosexual solicitation.203 For exam-
ple, in Vujosevic v. Rafferty, the defendant and a friend were harassing a 
male stranger when the defendant walked away to urinate.204 When 
the defendant returned, his friend was beating the stranger.205 His 
friend told him that the stranger had made a sexual advance, and the 
defendant then joined in the deadly beating.206 At trial, the defendant 
testified that "something snapped in his head" when he learned of the 
sexual advance, causing him to join in the beating.207 
Extending the HPD to these cases severely disassociates the de-
fense from the disorder, because it is the patient's latent homosexual-
ity, not another's sexuality, that is relevant to the disorder.208 The use 
of the HPD in these cases implies that the mere occurrence of a ho-
mosexual advance, irregardless of its implications for the defendant's 
sexuality, warrants the defendant's violent response.209 This sends the 
199 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 477; Comstock, supra note 19, at 88; Glick, supra note 
89, at 26. 
200 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 89. 
201 See id. 
202 See id. 
203 See id. at 94-95; Mison, supra note 13, at 169. 
204 See 844 F.2d 1023, 1025-26 (3d Cir. 1988). 
205 See id. 
206 See id. 
207 ld.; see also Wills iI. State, 636 P.2d 372, 373 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (defendant 
kicked and beat victim to death after victim allegedly made sexual advance to third party). 
208 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 479-80, 507, 511. 
209 See Mison, supra note 13, at 170. 
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dangerous message that homosexual conduct, in and of itself, justifies 
anti-gay violence.210 
6. Gender-Exclusivity 
The HPD is additionally disassociated from the disorder by the 
fact that only male defendants typically assert it.2l1 This is curious 
given that Kempf recorded homosexual panic in both male and fe-
male patients.212 Professor Comstock half-heartedly suggests a simple 
explanation: a lack of anti-lesbian murder by women.213 While it is 
possible that there has yet to be an instance of comparable anti-
lesbian murder, this seems implausible given that the homosexual 
panic disorder is a disorder to which both genders fall prey.214 
More likely, female defendants do not assert the HPD for the 
same reasons that male defendants do assert it-because its usefulness 
lies in its ability to seduce heterocentric prejudices and sympathies.215 
Considering the framework for permissible social relationships on 
which our heterocentric society is built, it is both conceivable and un-
derstandable for a man to react violently to a homosexual solicitation, 
because men are not supposed to be solicited.216 However, part and 
parcel of this scheme that expects that men will not be solicited, is the 
expectation that women, in contrast, will be solicited.217 Therefore, 
the HPD is more likely to be effective, and therefore more likely to be 
used, in rationalizing the violent responses of men than it is for 
women.218 Comstock rightly argues that "[t]he soundness of the de-
fense's premise"-that the disorder causes murderous behavior-
"should be challenged according to its inability to reflect the behavior 
of the universe of those who suffer from [it]."219 
210 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 97; Mison, supra note 13, at 170. 
211 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 89-90; Mison, supra note 13, at 169. 
212 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 506-1l. 
213 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 89. 
214 See id. at 89-90. 
215 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19-20; Comstock, slljJra note 19, at 89-90. 
216 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19-20; Comstock, slljJra note 19, at 89; Valdes, supra 
note 25, at 179; Mison, supra note 13, at 155. 
217 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 99. 
218 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19-20; Comstock, supra note 19, at 89. 
219 Comstock, supra note 19, at 90. 
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7. Defense to Violence and Murder 
The most glaring evidence of the disassociation of the HPD from 
its psychiatric roots lies in its very assertion and application as a cul-
pability-reducing defense to violence and murder.220 Regardless of 
which aspects of the disorder are ignored or contradicted in any given 
case involving the HPD, each and every case alleges some degree of 
homosexual sexual solicitation by the victim and a gratuitous degree 
of violence by the defendant in response.221 However, sexual proposi-
tions or advances by others are not causal elements within the clinical 
definition of the homosexual panic disorder.222 Furthermore, patients 
that are clinically diagnosed with the disorder are se?fpunishing, if 
they able to function at all.223 Thus, the homosexual panic disorder 
seems hardly suitable as a basis for a legal explanation or justification 
for anti-gay violence.224 The consistent application of the HPD to vio-
lent fact patterns evinces a fundamental split between the construc-
tion of the HPD and the clinical understanding of the homosexual 
panic disorder on which it is supposedly based.225 
In sum, the relationship of the HPD to the psychiatric disorder is 
tenuous at best.226 The various points of departure between the legal 
defense and the clinical disorder, when coupled with the legal sys-
tem's failure to demand a consistent definition of the defense across 
cases, suggests that the HPD is barely rooted, if at all, in the bona fide 
homosexual panic disorder.227 This begs the question: if the defense is 
not rooted in the psychiatric literature, then what is it based in? Per-
haps the answer lies, at least in part, in Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's postu-
lation that the HPD rests on the incorrect but socially pervasive per-
ception that violence against gays is so atypical as to be seen as an 
illness, yet so understandable as to be excusable.228 
220 See id. at 86. 
221 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 86; Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 502. 
222 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 84; Hart, supra note 87, at 203-07; Bagnall et aI., su-
pra note 10, at 502. 
223 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 491; Glick, supra note 89, at 21; Hart, supra note 87, at 
205. 
224 See KEMPF, supra note 79, at 491; Comstock, supra note 19, at 86; Hart, supra note 
87, at 203-07. 
225 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 86-89. 
226 See id. at 86-96. 
227 See id. 
228 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19. 
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IV. THE (AB)USE OF THE DEFENSE 
The likelihood that the HPD is rooted more in social and institu-
tional prejudice than in medicine and science suggests that its use 
carries an enormous potential for abuse.229 Furthermore, this poten-
tial easily leads to propensity for abuse, because just as the disassoci-
ated and inconsistent use of the HPD suggests that it is rooted in anti-
gay bias, this very same bias suggests that the defense can, and will, be 
blatantly abused.230 Thus, the disassociation of the defense from the 
psychiatric disorder and its inconsistent application across cases is 
both an indication and a product of the HPD's survival and capitaliza-
tion on the conflation of interpersonal fear, disgust, and hatred of 
gays within a legal system that histOlically devalues them.231 Indeed, 
examples of the strategic, normalizing approaches of attorneys who 
rely on the defense, of the explicit biases of judges who allow the de-
fense, and of the egregious violence that juries excuse when they are 
instructed to consider the defense, buttress the notion that the use of 
the HPD, while always inherently questionable, is sometimes blatantly 
abusive.232 
A. Abuse 17y Attorneys 
Noting the HPD's illegitimate basis in the homosexual panic dis-
order, Professor Comstock argues that the HPD is a "strategy of legal 
defense that [relies] almost exclusively on the anti-gay/lesbian biases 
of judges and jurors .... "233 This implies that defense attorneys assert 
the HPD because they hope that the defense will seduce other court-
room actors' prejudices and sympathies away from the brutalized vic-
tim and toward the defendant.234 It also implies that defense attorneys 
may do so even when they, themselves, do not believe that the defen-
dant, in fact, suffers from a bona fide case of homosexual panic dis-
order.235 While every defendant has a Constitutional right to an ade-
quate defense, such questionable use-and perhaps, abuse-of the 
HPD not only calls into question the integrity of the defense, but also 
229 See id.; Comstock, supra note 19, at 86-96; Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 502; Mi-
son, supra note 13, at 167. 
230 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19, 20. 
231 See id. at 20; see also discllssion supra Parts I, III. 
232 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 81, 86-96; see also discussion infi'{l Part IV.A-C. 
233 Comstock, supra note 19, at 81, 86-96. 
234 See id.; Mison, supra note 13, at 161-62. 
235 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 81, 86-96; Mison, slljJ/"a note 13, at 161-62. 
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accrues the great moral cost of further extending an already slippery 
slope of legally-sanctioned violence against gays.236 
The statements of a defense attorney in an interview during a 
homicide case in Minnesota verify that such strategic abuse of the 
HPD does, indeed, occur.237 He is quoted as saying that "[he] would 
have loved former Marines, former servicemen [on the jury], because 
there's a strong element of antagonism toward homosexuals in groups 
like that. "238 He also noted that his use of the HPD worked as he had 
planned, stating that the jury was "thrown off balance" when he 
claimed the defendant's assault was a reaction to homosexual ad-
vances.239 
Furthermore, attorneys' reliance on the HPD, and its commen-
surate bias, inside of the courtroom, threatens to extend the alarming 
abuse of the HPD to scenarios outside of the legal system and beyond 
situations involving assault or murder.24o For example, in 1982, Ohio's 
Attorney General responded to the State Youth Services Director's 
inquiry about the employment of gays by concluding that homosexual 
panic may justify consideration of a job applicant's sexual orienta-
tion.241 Relying on illegitimate legal interpretations of the psychiatric 
disorder, he stated that "knowledge that an employee has other than 
heteros~xual orientation may result in what psychologists term homo-
sexual panic-a combination of fear and hostility .... In 15-20% of 
youths [this] fear of sexual molestation may manifest itself in a 'will 
kill if approached' attitude. "242 Thus, he granted permission to condi-
tion the acceptance of gay job applicants on a finding that their ho-
mosexuality will not cause panic.243 This normalizing application of 
the HPD suggests that it may be available as both an impetus for and a 
justification of broad-based anti-gay bias whenever an individual is 
even aware that another individual is gay.244 
236 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Comstock, supra note 19, at 86-96; Bagnall et aI., supra 
note 10, at 513-14; Mison, supra note 13, at 167, 172. 
237 See Peter Fl-eiberg, Blalllhlg the Victim: New Life for the "Gay Panic" Defense, Anvoc. 
(L.A.), May 24,1988, at 12. 
238Id. 
239 See id. 
240 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 514. 
241 See id. at 512. 
242 See id. (quoting an opinion by the Ohio Attorney General. Op. Att'y Gen. of Ohio 
No. 82-078 (Sept. 30, 1982». 
243 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 512. 
244 See id.; Mison, supra note 13, at 170. 
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B. Almse by Judges 
Judges, like attorneys, also abuse the HPD.245 Despite the HPD's 
tenuous connection to its psychiatric roots and its inconsistent appli-
cation as, and unclear compatibility with, legal insanity, "[n] 0 court 
has barred the defense . .. [using the reasoning that] it rests on an 
untenable psychological theory, or [that] it is an unwarranted exten-
sion of the insanity defense. "246 Rather, the consistent allowance of an 
inconsistent defense suggests that anti-gay bias works in tandem with 
judicial discretion in fostering judicial decisions that allow the use, 
and abuse, of the defense. 247 
Examples of cases involving the HPD in which judges have explic-
itly expressed their own anti-gay biases abound.248 In one instance, at 
a pre-trial hearing to review the facts of an anti-gay murder, Circuit 
Judge Daniel Futch jokingly asked the prosecutor, "That's a crime 
now, to beat up a homosexual?"249 When the prosecutor responded, 
"Yes, sir. And it's a crime to kill them," the judged replied, "Times 
really have changed. "250 Although Judge Futch was ultimately re-
moved from the case, this was not the result in a case in San Fran-
ciSCO.251 In that case, California Superior Court Judge Daniel Wein-
stein presided over an entire trial involving the HPD, without a jury, 
and ultimately pronounced the defendant guilty of manslaughter.252 
However, he tainted his ruling with anti-gay bias, stating that the vic-
tim "had 'contributed in large part to his own death' by his 'repre-
hensible conduct'" because the victim allegedly solicited his killer 
hours before he was murdered.253 Similarly, in another case, Judge 
Jack Hampton imposed only a thirty-year sentence on the defendant, 
instead of the maximum sentence of life imprisonment, for the mur-
ders of two gay men.254 He stated that he did not "much care for 
245 See Mison, supra note 13, at 163; see also discussion slljJra Part IV.A. 
246 Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 501; see Comstock, supra note 19, at 86-96. 
247 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 515; Mison, slljJra note 13, at 163. 
248 See infra notes 249-255 and accompanying text. 
249 See Mison, supra note 13, at 163 (citing Suzanne Bryant, National Lesbian & Gay 
Law Association, RemaI'ks Before the A.B.A. Judicial Conduct Subcommittee 4 (Sept. 22, 
1989». 
250 See Bryant, sujJra note 249. 
251 See Mison, supra note 13, at 163 n.211; Roben Lindsey, Aftl'/' Trial, Homosexuals Sa.y 
jllstice is Not Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1988, at A17. 
252 Lindsey, supra note 251, at A17. 
253 [d. 
254 See Panel to Examine Remarks by judge on Homosexuals, N.¥. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1988, at 
A16. 
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queers cruising the streets," that "[t]hese two guys ... wouldn't have 
been killed if they hadn't been cruising the street picking up teen-age 
boys," and that he "put prostitutes and gays at about the same level ... 
[and would] be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prosti-
tute."255 
Although judicial bias does not definitively flow from judicial dis-
cretion, the disparity in outcomes between cases in which judges ar-
ticulate explicit biases against gays and cases in which they do not is 
noteworthy. For example, in a case in Washington, D.C., Judge H. 
Carl Moultries requested an advisory letter from the San Francisco 
District Attorney's office before allowing the defendant to assert the 
HPD.256 Mter receiving the opinion, the judge requested that the de-
fendant be given extensive psychological testing.257 Although the de-
fendant had requested confinement for psychiatric treatment, Judge 
Moultries instead sent the defendant to jail for six to twenty years fol-
lowing the testing.258 Thus, because judges are not immune to the cul-
tural devaluation of gays, nor to attorneys' efforts to elicit these 
prejudices, broad judicial discretion in cases involving the HPD exac-
erbates the inconsistent and inappropriate use, and abuse, of the de-
fense. 259 
C. Abuse byJuries 
Like attorneys and judges, juries are susceptible to the abuse of 
the HPD.260 The U.S. Constitution makes an attempt to counteract 
juror prejudices by requiring that jurors represent a cross-section of 
the community.261 However, this requirement cannot completely nul-
lify the psychological imprint of anti-gay bias that pervades American 
culture and the very communities from which jurors come to join the 
jury box.262 Homosexuality is a topic that implicates deep-seated per-
sonal values, biases, and prejudices.263 Jurors are particularly suscepti-
ble to these biases when attorneys and judges elicit and reinforce anti-
2551d. 
256 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 100-01. 
257 See id. at 10 1. 
258 See id. 
259 See Mison, supra note 13, at 158, 163. 
260 See id. at 162-63; see also discussion supra Part IV.A-B. 
261 See U.S. CONST. amend VI; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,527-28 (1975) (hold-
ing that the Sixth Amendment requires petit jury be selected from representative cross-
section of community); Mison, sllpra note 13, at 162-63. 
262 See Mison, supra note 13, at 162-63. 
263 See id. at 162. 
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gay stereotypes through their use of the HPD.264 When the HPD se-
duces jurors' biases, jurors are more likely to excuse or exculpate an ti-
gay violence.265 
One anti-gay stereotype that the HPD reinforces for jurors is the 
notion that gay men are sexual predators.266 Jurors under the spell of 
this stereotype have reduced defendants' culpability not only when 
the defendant has failed to produce any evidence of a homosexual 
solicitation, but also when strong evidence suggests that the defen-
dant preyed on the gay victim.267 
In Mills v. Shepard, for example, the defendant raised the HPD, 
alleging that his actions were in response to an uninvited homosexual 
solicitation.268 He admitted that he voluntarily accompanied the vic-
tim to an isolated spot after meeting him in a gay bar.269 He also ad-
mitted that he "pushed [the victim] out of his car, chased him ... , 
knocked him down, kicked him, pulled his pants down to hinder pur-
suit, took [his] jewelry ... , left him lying near the [creek in which the 
body was later found], and drove home" in the victim's car.270 He fur-
ther admitted bragging to his roommates that he had "rolled a 
queer. "271 However, despite this strong evidence that the defendant 
preyed on the victim, the jury reduced his culpability on account of 
the homosexual solicitation, finding the defendant guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter rather than murder or felony-murder. 272 
Another anti-gay perception that the HPD triggers in jurors is 
that a homosexual advance, even if merely verbal, is equivalent to a 
sexual attack.273 Arguably, a mere advance does not necessitate a vio-
lent or murderous response, even if made by an individual with a dif-
ferent sexual orientation than the individual solicited.274 Lois Reckitt 
of the National Organization of Women quips, "I am a lesbian and I 
have been approached by men in straight bars. In discouraging their 
advances, I have never found it necessary to try to kill them. I [say] 
264 See id. at 162-63; see also discussion supra Part IV.A-B. 
265 See Mison, supra note 13, at 162-63. 
266 See SEDGWICK, supra note IS, at 19. 
267 See Mills v. Shepard, 445 F. Stipp. 1231, 1234 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Comstock, supra 
note 19, at 97; Bagnall et ai., sujn'a note 10, at 499. 
268 See 445 F. Stipp. at 1232; Mison, supra note 13, at 16S. 
269 See Shepard, 445 F. Supp. at 1234. 
270 [d.; see Mison, supra note 13, at 16S. 
271 Shepard, 445 F. Supp. at 1234. 
272 See id. at 1232; Mison, supra note 13, at 16S. 
273 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 97; Bagnall et ai., supra note 10, at 499. 
274 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 99. 
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'no."'275 However, the notion "[t]hat a sexual advance made by a gay 
man does itself pose a danger meriting retaliation appears to be a bias 
shared by some judges and jurors. "276 The implications of using the 
HPD to seduce this manifestation of anti-gay bias are twofold. First, if 
a mere verbal solicitation is equivalent to an attack, then this implies 
that it is not the victim's advance per se that poses the threat; rather, 
the threat is the victim's assertion of their homosexual orientation, or 
their homosexual identity, in and of itself.277 Second, it implies that a 
disproportionate, violent response to a homosexual solicitation is 
more acceptable than the solicitation itself.278 
The most fundamental form of anti-gay bias that the HPD elicits 
for jurors is the notion that the gay victim is to blame for his own de-
mise.279 This notion is integral to the HPD; the defense, notably un-
like the disorder, rests on the basic premise that the victim's homo-
sexuality triggered the defendant's panic.28o Thus, in the high-profile 
People v. Schmitz case, Schmitz blamed Amedure's homosexual "am-
bush" for his violent actions.281 Although strong evidence suggested 
that Schmitz's actions were premeditated-he withdrew money, pur-
chased a gun, took it to Amedure's home, and shot him-the jury re-
turned a verdict finding him guilty not of first-degree murder, as he 
was charged, but of the lesser offense of second-degree murder.282 
Moreover, in cases in which the victim's homosexuality is in dis-
pute, this victim-blaming aspect of the HPD is more subtle, yet also 
more sinister, because it places the victim, rather than the defendant, 
on tria1.283 For example, in State v. Rivera, the defendant claimed that 
the victim made a sexual advance, and a defense-generated "minitrial" 
developed as to whether or not the victim was even a homosexua1.284 
The victim's wife and friends testified that the victim was heterosex-
ual, and thus unlikely to make a sexual advance.285 This dispute inap-
propriately shifted the trial away from the defendant, since the char-
275Id. at 99-100. 
276 Id. at 97. 
277 See id. 
278 See id. 
279 See Mison, supra note 13, at 171-72. 
280 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 499; Mison, supra note 13, at 171-72. 
281 586 N .W.2d 766, 768 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). 
282 See id. at 768-69. 
283 See State v. Rivera, 733 P.2d 1090, II 00 (Ariz. 1987); Mison, supra note 13, at 171-
72. 
284 See Rivera, 733 P.2d at 1l00; Mison, supra note 13, at 168. 
285 See Rivera, 733 P.2d at 1100; Mison, supra note 13, at 168-69. 
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actedstics of the defendant establish the presence of the homosexual 
panic disorder, particularly the primary requirements that the defen-
dant have long-term, latent homosexual cravings.286 
Given the HPD's power to seduce the deep-seated, anti-gay per-
sonal values and prejudices of all courtroom actors, it is a strategy of 
legal defense that harbors enormous potential for abuse.287 Inconsis-
tent precedent and a critical disassociation from the disorder on 
which the HPD is based further exacerbate this problem.288 Thus, ei-
ther new evidentiary rules must limit the damage of this defense, or 
the defense must be eliminated altogether. 
V. RESTRICTING THE HPD's USE 
If American culture and society seems to suggest that violence 
against gays is a warranted, if not necessary, response to a homosexual 
solicitation, then the question that follows is whether, and to what de-
gree, society is willing to excuse this violence against gays when it oc-
curs.289 Attorneys' express attempts to manipulate the HPD to capital-
ize on and normalize anti-gay prejudice buttress the HPD's powerful 
appeal to judges' and jurors' biases.29o The resulting inconsistent, in-
appropdate, and yet successful assertions of the HPD, especially in 
egregious cases of violence against gays, demonstrate that our legal 
system is not only capable, but willing to excuse violence against 
gays.291 "Thus gays dsk becoming fair game for assaults," and such 
crimes against them serve as their perpetrators' own defenses.292 
However, "[anti-gay] bias is less operative and requirements for proof 
more stdngent in the higher courts. "293 This inverse correlation sug-
gests that systemic reform to curb the abuses of the HPD is possible. 
Several options exist to alleviate the problems inherent in the use 
of the HPD. The most obvious option is to eliminate the defense alto-
gether.294 Several reasons urge this solution. First, the HPD is based 
286 See Rivera, 733 P.2d at llOO; Comstock, supra note 19, at 90-91, 93; Mison, supra 
note 13, at 168. 
287 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 81; Mison, sllpranote 13, at 167. 
288 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 81; Mison, supra note 13, at 167; see also discussion 
supra Part III. 
289 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 499; see also discussion supra Part I. 
290 See Mison, sujJra note 13, at 167; see also discussion supra Pan IV. 
291 See discussion supra Part III. 
292 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 514-15. 
293 Comstock, supra note 19, at 100. 
294 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 515. 
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on scant and sketchy psychiatric literature.295 Second, to the extent 
that such literature exists, typical formulations of the HPD do not 
comport with, and indeed, frequently establish symptoms that are the 
inverse of the symptoms defined under the disorder.296 Third, perhaps 
because the HPD bears little relation to the disorder on which it is 
predicated, the HPD is inconsistently asserted and applied across 
cases.297 Fourth, because the HPD bears but a tenuous connection to 
the psychiatric disorder and is inconsistently asserted, it also embodies 
a tremendous propensity for seducing courtroom actors' biases.298 
Finally, our legal system does not accept "race panic," "gender panic," 
or "heterosexual panic" as culpability-reducing defenses to violence 
against people of color, women, and heterosexuals.299 "In fact, our 
legal system frequently deals more seriously with acts of violence di-
rected against minority groups than with acts of violence generally. "300 
Thus, the HPD-homophobia under the guise of an uncommon dis-
order turned common defense-should neither be an accepted nor 
an acceptable defense to violence against gays. 301 
If the legal system accepts the HPD as a defense to anti-gay vio-
lence, then it should demand that the defense conform to the psychi-
atric disorder from which it supposedly gains its legitimacy.302 In par-
ticular, the fact that psychologists and psychiatrists disagree as to 
whether the disorder is a mere psychological disturbance or a "mental 
defect or disease" rising to the level of legal insanity leads to inconsis-
tent applications of the HPD and counsels against permitting the as-
sertion of the HPD as a form of insanity defense until the psychiatric 
underpinnings of the disorder are more clearly defined.303 Further-
more, although the psychiatric literature underlying the HPD is scant 
and sketchy, the defense should, in the very least, consistently include 
the elements that are clearly defined as primary to the disorder, such 
295 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 89. 
296 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
297 See discussion supra Part III. 
298 See Mison, supra note 13, at 167; see also discussion supra Parts III, IV. 
299 SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19. 
300 Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 515. 
301 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 19. 
302 See Bagnall et aI., supra lIote 10, at 513-14. 
303 See id. (stating that courts lack the expertise to resolve the disagreements between 
psychiatric expel'ts in this area) . 
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as the disorder's "dual determinators" and its long-term, rather than 
momentary, nature.304 
The benefits of conforming the HPD to the disorder are several. 
First, requiring that the defense have a firm basis in the elements of 
the disorder promotes legitimacy and consistency in the defense's ap-
plication, while discouraging the inconsistencies that result from and 
enable the unconstrained biases of attorneys, judges, and juries.305 
Second, asserting the defense in accordance with the elements of the 
disorder alleviates the victim-blaming tendency of the HPD by shifting 
the focus of the trial from the victim's sexuality to the characteristics 
of the defendant. 306 Finally, conforming the HPD to the psychiatric 
disorder would likely result in the appropriate dismissal of all but the 
bona fide cases involving the disorder, since violence in response to a 
homosexual solicitation is highly inconsistent with the disorder.307 
In addition to conforming the HPD to the homosexual panic 
disorder, another method by which to alleviate the propensity for bias 
in the application of the HPD is to limit the amount of judicial discre-
tion involved in allowing the defense.308 Rape-law reform in the form 
of rape-shield statutes is a useful guide, because rape cases are similar 
to cases involving anti-gay violence in that both implicate deep-seated 
personal values, seduction of cultural stereotypes, and victim-
blaming.309 
As in scenarios involving violence against gays, our "male-
dominated legal system [originally] viewed rape as 'different' from 
other crimes because of a set of historical attitudes about women and 
sexuality[,]" including "a double standard for male and female sexual-
ity" and a cultural distinction between "good," chaste women and 
"bad," promiscuous women.310 These cultural stereotypes fueled the 
notion that unchaste women were less likely to be victims of uncon-
sentual sex, because they were more likely to consent to sexual en-
304 See KEMPF, SlIjlra note 79, at 511; Comstock, sujna note 19, at 84, 86-96; Glick, supra 
note 89, at 27; Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 514. 
305 Seediscussion supra Parts III.A, IV. 
306 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 97-100; Mison, sujlra note 13, at 170-71; see also su-
pra notes 279-286 and accompanying text. 
307 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 86 (deeming lise of the HPD in cases of violence 
against gays "inappropriate"). 
308 See Bagnall et aI., sltj1m note 10, at 514; see also discllssion supra Pal't IV.B. 
309 See Estrich, supra note 5, at 1091; Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding Raile 'Y'ictillls in the State 
and Federal Courts: it Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REy. 763, 791-93; Mison, 
supra note 13, at 162. 
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counters.311 Therefore, rape trials often focused on the chastity of the 
victim, her moral worth, and her concomitant likelihood to consent 
to a sexual encounter.312 Accordingly, defense attorneys engaged in an 
exposition of the victim's past sexual conduct, character assassina-
tions, and insinuations that the victim's appearance or conduct pro-
voked the rape.313 Empirical evidence supported suspicions that "ju-
rors misused evidence of unchaste" and "'victim-precipitating'" 
conduct to support their subscription to cultural attitudes about 
women and rape, and to reduce the culpability of, or simply to acquit, 
male defendants. 314 In response to this social and legal bias and a 
changing moral climate, the rape-reform movement generated rape-
shield legislation to "allow for the introduction of constitutionally 
compelled sexual conduct evidence while at the same time protecting 
the complainant and the fact-finding process against its irrelevant and 
prejudicial uses. "315 The ultimate goal was to strike a compromise be-
tween inflexible legislative rules and broad judicial discretion, without 
compromising the rights of either the defendant or the victim.316 
Although rape-reform remains a work in progress, it is a useful 
model for efforts to cure the ills of the courtroom biases that are at-
tendant to the use of the HPD.317 Like cases involving rape, cases in-
volving violence against gays involve victims whose sexuality is cultur-
ally and legally devalued.318 While women who dress provocatively are 
seen as unchaste, men who engage in homosexual behavior are 
stereotyped as sexual predators.319 In either scenario, defense attor-
neys' efforts to trigger these cultural stereotypes in the jury box are 
likely to take the form of victim-blaming and elicitation of sympathy 
for the defendant.32o Furthermore, efforts to prove that a victim is 
homosexual, and impliedly likely to make a homosexual advance, in-
volve the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence, such as 
prior homosexual activities and sexual paraphernalia, in the same way 
that efforts to suggest a rape victim's consent in the case at bar by 
3l\ See id. at 792. 
312 See id. at 792-93. 
313 See id. at 792-94. 
314 [d. at 796. 
315 See Galvin, supra note 309, at 798. 808. 
316 [d. 
317 See Estrich, supra note 5, at 1093 (discussing pros and cons of rape-reform legisla-
tion). 
318 See Galvin. supra note 309, at 791; Valdes, supra note 25, at 170. 
319 See Galvin, supra note 309, at 794-95; Herek & Berrill, supra note 40, at 295. 
320 See Galvin, supra note 309. at 794-96; Mison, supra note 13, at 163, 167, 171. 
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demonstrating her sexual promiscuity in general frequently tainted 
rape cases before the advent of rape-shield statues.321 Moreover, in 
both types of cases, judges, who are not immune to cultural biases, 
wield great discretion in deciding both what evidence to exclude and 
the scope of permissible questioning.322 Thus, legislation that imposes 
appropriate restraints on judicial discretion and refines the inconsis-
tent assertion and application of the HPD in cases involving violence 
against gays is a viable method for balancing the rights of the defen-
dant and the victim while reducing the pervasive influence of AIneri-
can social, cultural, and institutional anti-gay biases.323 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming, for the moment, that socially impermissible behavior, 
such as engaging in homosexuality, is synonymous with immoral be-
havior, "it is morally questionable to suggest that there is less societal 
harm in the [v]ictim's death merely because he acted immorally."324 
Yet, tl1is suggestion is exactly what the homosexual panic defense im-
plies. The stakes are simple and profound; they are life and death. In 
the Schmitz case, the jury sentenced Johnathon Schmitz to a kind of 
death within life-he went to prison. Scott AInedure died. Both fell 
victim to the heterosexism and commensurate homophobia that 
permeates AInerican society. 
In Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System, Robert G. 
Bagnall, Patrick C. Gallagher, and Joni L. Goldstein surmise that 
"[t]he fact that the [HPD] has not been rejected out of hand by the 
courts and legislatures may suggest that it appeals to the [anti-gay] 
bias of many individuals .... "325 Indeed, anti-gay bias is pervasive; it 
extends from the social interactions in which violence against gays 
occurs to the legal institutions in which gays seek protection and re-
dress. 326 Ironically, this anti-gay bias is not only the cause of, but it is 
the excuse for anti-gay violence.327 The legal system has mangled the 
homosexual panic disorder in order to create the HPD, such that the 
321 See Gah'in, supra note 309, at 794-95 (discussing the introduction of contraceptive 
use in rape trials); Mison, supra note 13, at 169. 
322 See Galvin, supra note 309, at 794-96, 800; see also discussion slljJra Part IV.B. 
323 See Galvin, supra note 309, at 808; see also discussion supra Parts I, lILA, IV.B. 
324 Mison, supra note 13, at 171-72 & n.279 (citing Joshua Dressler, REthinking Heat of 
Passion: A Defense in Search ofa Rationalf', 73]. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 446 (1982)). 
325 Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 515. 
326 See discussion supra Part I. 
327 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 501. 
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HPD bears only a tenuous connection to the scant psychiatric litera-
ture on which it is based.328 It is hardly surprising or unpredictable 
that the HPD is the legal embodiment of the same social prejudice 
that it was created to justify.329 The HPD's disassociation from the ho-
mosexual panic disorder, its inconsistent assertion and application 
across cases, and its solicitation of the express prejudices of defense 
attorneys,judges, and jurors alike, suggest that its use is misuse.33o 
However, "(j]ust because a society is heterocentric does not mean 
it has to tolerate or encourage violent homophobic acts. "331 Indeed, 
although the cultural devaluation of gays that is institutionalized in 
the legal system appears unyielding, recent years have witnessed a 
trend coupling the decriminalization of homosexual behavior with 
the first successful case demanding equal access for same-sex couples 
to the rights, obligations, and benefits of marriage.332 Because these 
positive changes are occurring at the same time that violence against 
gays is also on the rise, American society may be primed to scrutinize, 
limit, and better yet, eliminate the use of the HPD as a plausible de-
fense to these gratuitous crimes.333 
328 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 81 (stating HPD relies almost exclusively on anti-gay 
bias); see also discussion supra Part III. 
329 See Comstock, supra note 19, at 81; see also discussion supra Parts I, III. 
330 See Bagnall et aI., supra note 10, at 515; see also discussion supra Parts III.A, IV. 
331 Mison, supra note 13, at 173. 
332 See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (VI. 1999); see also supra note 53 and accompa-
nying text. 
333 See SEDGWICK, supra note 18, at 18. 
